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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOANNA MURPHY, 
Claimant/Petitioner, 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
LONG TERM DISABILITY PROGRAM 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER 
CASE NO. 20020942-CA 
BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a), § 49-11-613(7), and § 63-46b-16. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah State Retirement Board incorrectly interpreted the law of hearsay 
in administrative hearings when it failed to consider medical reports and medical statements 
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in its findings, concluding that "a finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely 
on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." 
Standard of review. The standard of review of the Board's denial of benefits is 
governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). UAPA provides, in relevant 
part: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(d)Petitioner must be substantially prejudiced by the agency's erroneous 
interpretation or application of the law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
The issue of whether medical evidence and medical statements were incorrectly 
excluded as hearsay from consideration in the Board's findings, is reviewed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b 10(3) and under the "residuum rule." A correction-of-error standard, giving 
no deference to agencies decisions, is used to review agencies' ruling on issues characterized 
as general law, including " rulings concerning interpretation of statutes unrelated to the 
agency." Morton Intern, Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, at 585 (Utah 1991). Because 
the agency is interpreting the UAPA, which is a general statute unrelated to the agency's own 
statute and its discretionary grants, the Board's statutory interpretation and application should 
be reviewed for correctness. This court has held that whether factual findings are based on 
a residuum of competent evidence is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Industrial 
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Power Contractors v. Industrial Com'n, 832 P.2d 477 (Utah App.1992). 
2. Whether the Board is required to decide the "reasonableness," of gainful 
employment a claimant is found capable of, provided by the definition of "total disability," 
including a consideration of any relevant vocational elements, and has incorrectly interpreted 
the law when concluding it has no burden of providing any vocational proof on this issue 
once a claimant has proved her impairment and functional limitations. 
Standard of Review: Petitioner must be substantially prejudiced by the agency's 
erroneous interpretation or application of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c) and 
(d). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he fact that the Administrative Procedure 
Act incorporates the terms 'application of the law' and 'interpretation of the law' under a 
single standard supports the contention that absent a grant of discretion, an agency's 
interpretation or application of statutory terms should be reviewed for error." Morton Intern., 
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
3. Whether the Utah State Retirement Board's decision denying long-term disability 
benefits was based upon substantial evidence. 
Standard of Review. Petitioner must be substantially prejudiced by: 
(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court; 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
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When determining whether an agency finding is supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole, this court weighs evidence that both supports and detracts 
from the finding. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67, 68 (Utah Ct. 
App.1989). Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence, but more 
than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id., at 68. Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality 
of relevant evidence that will convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nat'l 
Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 1990). However, findings 
will "not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the 
evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 
526-27 (Utah 1988). 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. Rule 24(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990). The burden 
lies with the petitioner, as the complaining party, to "marshall all of the evidence supporting 
the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d at 68. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are controlling in this action: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), (g), (h)(i) and (h)(iv) 
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Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613 
" *i Code Ann §49-21-102 
l Ian i. o J u . W.. .; ,') J I -401 ". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for review of a final agency ordei oi the Utah Stale Kuliinnciil 
;, „ . i ii'liiiiin In i liiiiip-lniiiiii disability 
11
 * ^j Term Disability Act. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Td. a prior decision, the Board granted Ms IV frit phy disability benefits f< n i l i : h ntial 
statutory peiu-i. : - . '*W II»PMI#1I St*pliM» 
en I1 • * - • • >ftriod. Ms. Murphy a benefits wcic discontinued. Ms. Murphy appealed 
the discontinuation of her benefits and was denied on December 27,2000 Ms. Murphy then 
requested a review of her denial by the Long Term Disability Claims K. , u\\ i jmmittee, and 
was denied al Llns ne \ iev\ mi \|tiil I 'Hill M« Mmpln .ipptMk'd this drill ml h\ A iiliiiip lu 
tl .* F \ . v t director of the Utah Retirement Systems, and was denied by the director on 
Jul} u, 2". _ s. Murphy appealed the director's denial and requested a hearing before a 
"hearing officer. A hearing was held on Api il 29, 2002 I indings of Fact, Cone:: of 
Find"^ of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order denying benefits were revised and 
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reissued September 26,2002. The revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
denying benefits was adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board on October 
10, 2002. This is an appeal from the above mentioned final agency action. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Joanna is 50 years old, born August 23, 1951. She graduated from Bingham High 
School, then attended the University of Utah, obtaining a Bachelor's degree in psychology 
in 1975. She successfully pursued a career as a Child Care Licensing Specialist for the State 
of Utah from 1987, until her medical condition forced her to discontinue work in 1998. As 
Dr. Joseph A. Brown explained in a letter dated August 14, 1998, Joanna was seriously ill 
at that time with chronic active Hepatitis C. Her illness was complicated by treatment with 
interferon and its serious side effects, leaving her with a substantial illness four to five days 
a week. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). During this same period, Joanna continued to developed 
other associated medical problems that have gradually worsened. Though Joanna's liver 
functions returned to normal by December of 2000, and the hepatitis C virus is at remission 
levels, she was left with a combination of severe physical impairments. Joanna has been 
medically determined to suffer from fibromyalgia, with associated fatigue, myalgias, 
arthralgias, insomnia, headaches, blepharitis, plantar fasciitis, and a tendency to develop 
other focal pain and inflammation. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3-14). She is diagnosed with, and 
is treated for several autoimmune diseases, hashimoto thyroiditis (Petitioner's Exhibits 14, 
15) celiac disease (Petitioner's Exhibits 15, 16, 17) and allergic reactions (Petitioner's 
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Exhibits 18-20). Additionally, she had been diagnosed, and is treated for Type II Diabetes 
1\ 1 ;:i:lll;tus (Petitioner's Exhibit 15) gastroesophageal reflux, lrrnaiiic nowcl syndrom. 
(Petitioner's hxhibils < >li i ai|)i"I luinicl llVlJtinnci i. IMnlnls I,1 "n \ .mil ivininil illi"JI> 
Jegenenilion (IMitinnn,,,"i Fxhibil 11 
SIB II L VRY OF AkGUMENT : 
Firsi *.. Board erroneously applied the law concerning the treatment nf hea^av 
e\ideiu.,v.
 is. -.Jiiuaisuair^. procceuni^ ^ • - u 
nialical siatiMiuMiK :v • MUV H!* Ms. Murphy's physical impairments, lh~ Liah 
Administrative Procedures Act and the "residuum, rule," correct! \ applied -• - M! 1 =• - have 
required the exclusion of such evidence from consideration ^ ^. i, making nnau.g.- v , ^ ; 
regaiJiiig.-i -, *M , > i IOIICIUMMII1. M" l.iw kisnl upi'ii Ihosr l]ii<,liii*M, I In1" 
c
 u Ux. liatemaii provided the required residuum of 
evidence. 
Secondly, the Board incorrectly interprets the statutorily imposed DaRicn *,; piuui. 
Both case law under related aie as o( disabilih Liv\ .mini llu I nil-"! n in 1 hsabthh Piupnun's 
: •• - oedure*- provide guidance for interpretating the law regarding the 
scope of the "burden of proof" imposed upon employees at disability hearings. The 
definition of "total disability'' requires that garni u enip.^sinem .:.L jinpio. x , i 
i.apablr iif must b "iv.isunablr iind llnl uKitduihil tjIc'mrnls must U i wihidervd when 
ieterm ining that employment. At earlier levels of determinations of "total disability" the 
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agency collects the information needed to determine "reasonable" employment, considering 
the employees medical-vocational background. The agency should continue this role at the 
hearing level. In this sense, the agency has some burden of proof already built into its 
procedures, to enable its determinations. This burden should remain with the agency, and 
should not shift to the employee at the hearing level, to provide the vocational expertise 
required to make a determination of "reasonable" employment, after she has proven her 
impairments and functional limitations. 
Lastly, the Board's denial of disability benefits rested upon the testimony and 
evaluation by a physical therapist, as well as the purported failure of Dr. Bateman to provide 
sufficient evidence supporting proof of disability. The physical therapist has training and 
experience rehabilitating and evaluating injured workers, primarily in workers' compensation 
cases. According to the testimony of Dr. Bateman, a consulting specialist Ms. Murphy was 
referred to, and supported by medical reports and statements of many other doctors, Ms. 
Murphy has a systemic illness of a chronic nature, rather than an acute work-related injury. 
Dr. Bateman testified that the type of evaluation performed by the physical therapist is 
inadequate for evaluating the expected on-the-job performance by those with systemic 
illness. Medical reports and statements supporting Ms. Murphy's medical problems, and 
functional limitations were not considered by the Board in its findings. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE BOARD ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE HEARSAY RULE 
WHEN IT EXCLUDED MEDICAL RECORDS AND MEDICAL 
STATEMENTS FROM ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Board excluded from its consideration of the issue of medical impairment twenty-
two exhibits, and approximately 116 pages of medical reports and medical statements, 
including those of numerous diagnostic tests.1 After admitting the medical reports and 
medical statements into evidence, the Board finds: 
6. Petitioner failed to provide any non-hearsay evidence showing she 
maintained any medically determinable physical impairment from accepted 
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 3. The Public Employees' 
Long-Term Disability Act defines 'Total disability": 
'Total disability" means, after the elimination period and the first 24 months 
of disability benefits, the complete inability, based solely on physical objective 
medical impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, 
considering the eligible employee's education, training, and experience. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-21-102(1 l)(b). "Objective medical impairment" is defined: 
"Objective medical impairment" means an impairment resulting from an injury 
or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on accepted 
objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective complaints. 
diagnostic tests include an MRI, a nerve conduction study (EEG), laboratory 
reports, a biopsy, testing related to sleep disorder, and pulmonary function. 
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It is true that many of the medical records and statements admitted into evidence, 
including medical documents of laboratory and other diagnostic testing, were hearsay. Ms. 
Murphy was unable to produce as witnesses the numerous doctors, radiologists, hospital 
technicians, and other health care professionals, involved in the treatment, diagnosing, and 
testing of her medical problems.2 
As this Court noted in Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449 (Utah App. 1993): 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that there are "significant differences 
between court trials and proceedings before administrative agencies and that 
the technical rules of evidence need not be applied before the latter." Yacht 
Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984) 
(footnote omitted). Hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings before 
administrative agencies. Id. However, findings of fact cannot be based 
exclusively on hearsay evidence; they must be supported by a residuum of 
legal evidence competent in a court of law. Id. 
Evidence of Ms. Murphy's impairments does not rest exclusively on hearsay. The 
necessary residuum of competent evidence supporting a finding that Ms. Murphy has 
physical impairments consists of the Ms. Murphy's and Dr. Bateman's sworn testimony 
regarding her impairments. Once an employee's testimony concerning her impairments is 
supported with the objective medical data supplied in medical reports, the claims of disability 
should no longer be considered merely "subjective complaints," but should be considered 
2It seems unlikely there are many disabled employees who are able to afford such 
an onerous requirement, or are able to track down the considerable numbers of 
individuals involved in the production of their medical records, to provide testimony 
under oath about the truth of the matters reported in those documents. 
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competent testimony of the claimant's direct knowledge of an "objective medical 
impairment." The information providing objective clinical, laboratory, and diagnostic testing 
data, should no longer be considered mere hearsay when testified to under oath by those with 
direct knowledge on the issue of Ms. Murphy's impairments, i.e., Ms. Murphy and Dr. 
Bateman. 
The Board offered no objections at the hearing to any of the medical documents or 
medical statements submitted as evidence, and all twenty five of Ms. Murphy's exhibits were 
admitted into evidence. Tr. 3:22 through 7: 6. Ms. Murphy provided sworn testimony at the 
hearing on April 29, 2002, regarding all of the impairments documented in the medical 
records and also testified to her functional limitations associated with these impairments; 
information which is also reported in several medical statements by Ms. Murphy's doctors 
and her physical therapist. 
Ms. Murphy testified to her esophagus reflux, Tr. 10:17, insomnia, Tr. 10:19-24,22: 
12-25,23: 1-11, plantar fasciitis, Tr. 11:1-14,31: 13-14, physical therapy and exercises, 11: 
1-11, 14: 7-12, 31: 2-3, allergies and blepharitis, Tr. 11:19-25, 28: 20-24, functional 
limitations, Tr. 12:10-13,16:1-23,17:13-25,23:12-25,24:1-3, hypothyroidism,^. 12:25, 
fatigue, Tr. 13:10-19, neck pain and headache, Tr. 13: 22-23, 17: 2-9, carpel tunnel, Tr. 
14:8-11, 18: 11-25, 19: 1-12, 35: 23-25, 36: 1-3, celiac disease and diabetes, Tr. 14: 16-25, 
15:1-14,28:1-14, automobile accidents, Tr. 21:15-24, hepatitis C,Tr. 21:19-24, Interferon 
therapy, Tr. 22:2-7, pain and fatigue, Tr. 27: 1-18, irritable bowel syndrome, Tr. 27: 11, 
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fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue, Tr. 29:4-11,31: 4-12, MRI and EEG, Tr. 36: 18-20. Ms. 
Murphy testified she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia by Dr. Anderson, Dr. Kurrus, and Dr. 
Lee Smith, and was referred to Dr. Bateman by Dr. Barbuto. 
Dr. Bateman testified as an expert in the area of chronic fatigue and fibromyalgia, and 
as a consulting specialist to whom Ms. Murphy had been referred by her doctor. Tr. 36:10-
32, 38: 9-15, 29: 2-15. Dr. Bateman testified she evaluated Ms. Murphy in an initial 
consultation on October 27, 2000, and again on February 20, 2002. As part of the first 
consultive exam, and after an extensive review of Ms. Murphy's medical and psychosocial 
history, Dr. Bateman found that Ms. Murphy met the medical criteria for fibromyalgia. Tr. 
42-44. Dr. Bateman then testified, in depth, about Ms. Murphy's underlying medical 
problems "contributing and compounding" her fibromyalgia symptoms, and included 
numerous references to the information found in the medical and diagnostic reports she had 
reviewed. Tr.43:14-25,44:1-9. Dr. Bateman read from her own evaluation of Ms. Muphy 
that "with this complex medical history, the fibromyalgia syndrome must be considered 
secondary to multiple underlying risk factors." Tr. 44: 20-22. Dr. Bateman opined at length 
on Ms. Murphy's underlying illnesses, and that fibromyalgia syndrome often occurs "in a 
piggyback fashion to other underlying illnesses." Tr. 45:12-15. Dr. Bateman testified these 
underlying illnesses include chronic hepatitis C, multiple head and neck trauma, type two 
diabetes, and autoimmune disease, which included her autoimmune thyroid disease, allergies, 
celiac and other "gut" disease . 43: 18-25, 44: 1-8, 22-24, 45: 1-4. Dr. Bateman read and 
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opined upon Dr. Anderson's Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire, agreeing with Dr. 
Anderson's assessment that, "given Joanna's combination of medical problems, that she 
would probably miss many more than four days per month, and would have difficulty 
working sequential full-time days, even in a week." Tr. 58: 21-25, 59: 1-16. 
Dr. Bateman testified about Ms. Murphy's sleep disorders, common with 
fibromyalgia, and found in Dr. Bateman's consultive report. Tr. 70: 8-25, 71: 1-8. Dr. 
Bateman also testified regarding Ms. Murphy's bowel function disorders, affected "because 
people with fibromyalgia get autonomic neurologic dysfunction, with includes regulation of 
bowel function . . . and hormonal and neurotransmitter abnormalities, which affect bowel 
function. Tr. 72: 1-7. Dr. Bateman opined about Ms. Murphy's "feeling lightheaded when 
she stands, and (inaudible) equilibrium bumping into walls, which is also well established." 
Tr. 72: 19-24. 
Dr. Bateman testified: 
The objective data, if I may list it, is just strong objective - data supporting 
(inaudible) supporting diabetes . . . neuropathy, pain, and fatigue are common 
symptoms of diabetes. She has clearly diagnosed hepatitis C. . . And I've 
already said that all of her symptoms could come from hepatitis C. She has 
documented hypothroidism. She has documented allergies, hypersensitivity, 
pneunomitis and herpes simplex." Tr. 83:25. Dr. Bateman testified that "it's 
listed in my report that she has carpal tunnel." 
Tr. 83: 7-8. Dr. Bateman also testified there is medical evidence that would support a neck 
or head injury. Tr. 84: 18-23. 
Because of the foregoing sworn testimony given by Ms. Murphy and Dr. Bateman, 
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it was incorrect to exclude the medical records from any consideration from the Findings of 
Fact based upon hearsay. Both Ms. Murphy and Dr. Bateman provided an ample residuum 
of competent evidence upon which to base findings of "objective medical impairment." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held it to be improper in a worker's compensation case 
for an administrative law judge to reject the statements of treating physicians which were 
unavailable as witnesses on the basis of hearsay. Bunnell v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 740 
P.2d 1331, (Utah 1987). The court found, 'There was no reason for the rejection of the 
statements on that basis." IcL at 1333. 
In this case, there is little difference in its effect, from rejecting the statements of 
treating physicians as evidence, and rejecting that same evidence from all consideration on 
the issue of medical impairments or functional limitations. 
The Board's basis for refusing to consider the medical records and medical statements 
is found in its Conclusions of Law: 
3. In formal administrative adjudicative proceedings, "A finding of fact that 
was contested may not be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." U.C.A. § 63-46b-
10(3). 
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 3, Conclusions of Law, p. 4. 
The Board's reliance on the above UAPA provision is rather confusing, in that the 
medical records and medical statements submitted into evidence by Ms. Murphy were not 
contested by the Board's only witness, Mr. Cory Davis. Mr. Davis, a physical therapist, 
testified only to his own functional evaluation of Ms. Murphy, but made no medical findings, 
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and did not contest any medical or clinical findings, diagnoses, laboratory or diagnostic 
testing reported in any medical reports or statements. 
POINT TWO 
THE BOARD ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECIDE THE ISSUE 
OF "REASONABLENESS" AND CONCLUDED IT SHARES 
NO BURDEN IN DETERMINING 'TOTAL DISABILITY" 
In its Conclusions of Law, the Board states: 
1. Pursuantto Utah Code Ann. §49-1-610 and §49-9-401, Petitioner bears the 
burden of proof in this matter. The Utah State Retirement Board is not subject 
to any state or federal statute, rule, or common law, such as any shifting 
burden standard, in determining whether a Petitioner qualifies for long-term 
disability benefits under Utah Code Annotated, Title 49. 
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Conclusions of Law, p. 3. In its Findings of Fact, the 
Board finds: 
4 . . . . [Dr. Bateman] testified that she was not an employment specialist and 
did not know the legal standards for disability in this case. 
Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 2. 
It is true that the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act imposes a burden 
of proof upon appellants. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) provides under the statutory 
section entitled "Appeals procedure - Right of appeal to hearing officer - Board 
reconsideration - Judicial review": 
(4) The moving party in any proceeding brought under this section shall bear 
the burden of proof. 
The above provision imposes a burden of proof upon an employee when she appeals 
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a decision to the executive director, to the hearing officer, and to the Board. However, as 
discussed below, there are numerous procedures and provisions followed by the Public 
Employees' Health Program ("PEHP")which demonstrate its involvement with vocational 
information gathering and determinations of "total disability" based upon that vocational 
information, and which occur prior to the levels of appeal for which the statutory burden of 
proof is provided. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-401 provides: 
(1) An eligible employee shall apply for long-term disability benefits under 
this chapter by: 
(b) signing a consent form allowing the office access to the eligible 
employee's medical records; and 
(c) providing any documentation or information reasonably requested 
by the office. 
(2) Upon request by the office, the participating employer of the eligible 
employee shall provide to the office documentation and information 
concerning the eligible employee. 
The Public Employees' Health Program ("PEHP") Long-Term Disability ("LTD") 
Program Master Policy3 provides under "G. How to file a Claim," as part of the application 
process: 
1. The following information must be submitted to and received by the 
Program within 90 days of initial application: 
a. . . . a signed consent form allowing the office access to the 
3See Master Policy pp. 4-6 in Addendum 10 
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Eligible Employee's medical records and employment records; 
b. A detailed statement from Physician(s) describing the 
objective basis for the diagnosis (including x-ray reports, and 
any other evaluative procedures); 
4. Eligible Employer must provide relevant information concerning the 
Eligible Employee's status, including: payroll information, job description, 
inability to perform services, job accommodation, etc. 
The Master Policy further provides, under H. Claims Appeal Process: 
1. If an Eligible Employee feels a disability claim has been denied 
inappropriately, a full review of the claim may be requested by writing to the 
LTD Claims Review Committee within 60 days of the date of the denial letter. 
The Master Policy additionally provides under "D. Rehabilitation": 
1. All Eligible Employees receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit under the 
Program shall be evaluated and when appropriate may be required to engage 
in a rehabilitation program. 
2. . . . The program may refer the Eligible Employee to a disability specialist 
for a review of the Eligible Employee's condition and a written rehabilitation 
plan. 
The above provisions delineate part of the process the LTD program undergoes when 
an employee pursues a claim for long-term disability benefits. The program collects medical 
information from the employees' medical sources, and vocational and employment 
information from the employer. The LTD program is also authorized to provide vocational 
evaluation and rehabilitation, referring the employee to individuals with expertise in that 
area, to determine the possibility for reentry into the job market. After gathering the relevant 
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information the LTD program makes its determinations of "total disability." 
The LTD program provides for two levels of disability determinations on the issue of 
"total disability," made by the agency before the burden of proof imposed by § 49-11-613(4) 
occurs. Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-401(3) provides for the program's initial determination 
under a section entitled "Disability benefits - Application - Eligibility": 
(3) The office shall review all relevant information and determine whether or 
not the eligible employee is totally disabled. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-102(1 l)(b) defines "Total disability": 
"Total disability" means, after the elimination period and the first 24 months 
of disability benefits, the complete inability, based solely on physical objective 
medical impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, 
considering the eligible employee's education, training, and experience. 
Upon being denied disability benefits beyond the initial two year period, Ms. Murphy 
was informed that the process of appeal was identical to her initial application: she was 
notified that a caseworker had determined she was not "totally disabled" beyond the first 
two-year period of disability, and that she could appeal this denial by requesting review by 
the LTD Review Committee. Petitioner's Exhibit lc. The LTD Review Committee then 
requested information regarding Ms. Murphy's functional restrictions and limitations relative 
to her activities of "daily living, sedentary employment, and rehabilitation efforts." 
Petitioner's Exhibit Id. The LTD Review Committee next issued a denial stating "with 
proper management of your conditions, work within sedentary classifications is appropriate." 
Petitioner's Exhibit le. 
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Ms. Murphy was at no time required to determine, based upon her medical records, 
employment and vocational information, physical therapy and rehabilitation records, what 
type of job would be "reasonable" for her, considering her impairments and other vocational 
information. The LTD Review Committee arrived at the conclusion, after reviewing her 
records, that Ms. Murphy would be capable of working at jobs with a "sedentary 
classification." This conclusion by the LTD Review Committee seems to reference the same 
classification of jobs according to their strength or exertional requirements, as defined by the 
Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), which was later testified 
to by the Board's witness.4 
This approach by the LTD Program, is entirely consistent with other agencies 
responsible for making disability determinations. In related areas of disability law, such as 
Social Security disability, and Workers' Compensation, a disability claimant is required to 
prove, through objective medical evidence, the impairments from which she suffers, and the 
degree of functional limitations resulting from these impairments. If the claimant's proven 
impairments, when considered along with other relevant vocational factors, prevent the 
claimant from either returning to prior work, or from fitting into well established exertional 
levels or categories of work available in the economy as defined by the Department of Labor 
(such as work within a "sedentary" or "light" classification), then agencies in these related 
4The DOT's categorization of job's according to "strength ratings" was submitted 
as Exhibit C at the hearing. 
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areas of disability law, have generally been considered to be in the best position to provide 
evidence there is work the claimant can perform, taking their functional limitations and 
vocational situation into consideration.5 
Under Social Security disability law, the Code of Federal Regulations provides 
medical and vocational guidelines which are displayed in the Code as a system of "grids."6 
This medical-vocational analysis codified in the "grids," synchronizes various combinations 
of DOT catagories of "strength ratings" ("sedentary", "light," "medium," etc.) with various 
vocational elements ("age," "education," "job skills," "experience"). When a disability 
claimant does not fit neatly within the medical-vocational guidelines of the "grids," the 
agency provides vocational experts to testify, providing information concerning what types 
of jobs are available in the national economy, considering the functional limitations due to 
medical impairments and the individual's vocational situation. This approach, and its 
"burden shifting," has long been supported by Federal case law. Channel v. Heckler, 742 
F2d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1984)7. 
5See Addendum 6-1 and 7-1. In both Social Security disability law and Workers' 
Compensation law, the function that remains with an individual, after taking all medical 
impairments into account, is termed the "residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv); and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). 
6See Addendum 8-1 
7
"The ALJ may apply the Secretary's medical-vocational guidelined (the grids) in 
lieu of taking the testimony of a vocational expert only when the grids accurately and 
completely describe the claimant's abilities and limitations." Jones v. Hedkler, 760 F.2d 
993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985). The Secretary may not rely on the grids alone when they do not 
accurately and comletely describe a claimant's RFC, the Secretary must also hear the testimony 
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Workers' Compensation law has a similar concept guiding medical-vocational 
determinations-that of the "odd lot." The "odd-lot" concept developed out of a common 
sense notion, and has also long been applied. The term "odd lot" was first used in the case 
of Cardiff Corp. v.Hall 1 K.B. 1009 (1911): 
[Tjhere are cases in which the onus of sh[o]wing that suitable work can in fact 
be obtained does fall upon the employer who claims that the incapacity of the 
workman is only partial. If the accident has left the workman so injured that 
he is incapable of becoming an ordinary workman of average capacity in any 
well known branch of the labour market- if in other words the capacities for 
work left to him fit him only for special uses and do not, so to speak, make his 
powers of labour a merchantable article in some of the well known lines of the 
labour market, I think it is incumbent upon the employer to sh[o]w that such 
special employment can in fact be obtained by him. If I might be allowed to 
use such an undignified phrase, I should say that if the accident leaves the 
workman's labour in the position of an "odd lot" in the labour market, the 
employer must sh[o]w that a customer can be found who will take it. 
The Utah Supreme Court followed the logic of this analysis when it opined in Marshall v. 
Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985): 
It is much easier for the [employer] to prove the employability of the 
[employee] for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to prove the 
universal negative of not being employable at any work. 
Marshall citing Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 704 P.2d 305 (1970). This "burden shifting" 
to the agency occurs even though Workers' Compensation Law also imposes the burden of 
proving "total disability" on the employee. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b) provides: 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence 
that: 
of a vocational expert. Perminter .v Heckler, 765 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; 
In analytical "steps" very similar to Social Security disability law, step four of Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-413(c) provides that "to find an employee permanently totally disabled, the 
commission shall conclude that: 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
account the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical 
capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
In the present case, the LTD program has the responsibility for determining "total 
disability" before the statutory burden is imposed upon an employee claiming long-term 
disability; the LTD program currently accepts and exercises its position in making vocational 
determinations based upon the claimant's demonstrated medical impairments and functional 
limitations. These initial determinations occur after the employee meets her burden of 
providing medical evidence to the LTD Program to prove the degree of her impairment. This 
sharing of burdens provided in the initial determination levels should inform the statutory 
burden imposed at the next levels of appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4). 
Accordingly, these relative burdens, already incorporated into the procedures at the two 
initial levels of the agency's determinations, should be retained throughout the appeals 
process. 
In fact, the procedures used at the hearing in the present case indicate that the Board 
has, at least in some of its actions, accepted this burden. A physical therapist was brought 
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in to evaluate Ms. Murphy and to provide testimony at her hearing in regards to her 
functional and vocational abilities. Because the physical therapist in this case testified he had 
never seen the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and his training and experience did not 
support the requisite vocational expertise, he was not qualified to testify to the issue of 
"reasonableness," or how particular medical impairments, might effect an individual's job 
prospects, considering that individuals particular vocational profile8. Tr. 103: 8-11. 
The definition of "total disability" clearly anticipates that a finding must be made 
concerning what is "reasonable" employment for the claimant, and that vocational elements 
must be considered when making this finding. The only remaining question is who must 
provide the vocational experts that can provide this critical information for the "total 
disability" findings-the disabled employee who may have few monetary resources at their 
disposal, or the agency, which is to some degree already providing this necessary element. 
POINT THREE 
MARSHALING THE RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE SHOWS 
THE BOARD FAILED TO SUPPORT ITS DECISION 
WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Marshaling Respondent's Evidence. Mr. Cory Davis, a physical therapist, performed 
a Physical Functional Capacity Evaluation on Ms. Murphy November 17,2000, and testified 
for the Board concerning Ms. Murphy's evaluation at the hearing. Mr. Davis opined in his 
;This issue is developed more fully on pages 30-33 of this brief. 
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evaluation that "Ms. Murphy can do more, at times, than she currently demonstrates, states 
or perceives." Respondent's Exhibit B, p. 5. The Functional Capacity Evaluation reports: 
despite times of significantly high pain ratings and reported fatigue she 
remained lighthearted, freely laughed and joked without apparent difficulty. 
This general attitude, combined with other observations such as excessive and 
non-anatomical pain drawing, excessively low functional status' reporting, self 
limitation without observed secondary muscle recruitment, etc. are considered 
to be signs of symptom magnification. 
Respondent's Exhibit B, p. 5. Mr. Davis testified, "She did have or seem to demonstrate an 
ability to do something more than what maybe her perceived ability would be." Tr. 90:8-10. 
Mr. Davis further pointed out that Ms. Murphy rated her level of disability at the time at 
seventy percent, which would be considered "crippling," and which is, on the rating scale, 
the most severe. She "actually rated herself below what would be considered sedentary level 
of work, or level of ability." Tr. 93: 7-17, 94: 9-11. Mr. Davis testified: 
the things she completed in the intake interview would lead one to believe that 
she was severely disabled or had a severe difficulty in performing many 
activities. And yet what I observed over the two days of activities that we did, 
she demonstrated that she was capable of doing quite a few activities. 
Tr. 96: 9-14. Mr. Davis, testified that the evaluation was divided over a two-day period of 
time and, referring to his evaluation report, testified he found she was able to participate in 
the evaluation over both days, lasting anywhere from two to three hours each day. Tr. 88:20-
22, 89: 24-25, 90: 1-2. 
Mr. Davis's evaluation included testing for activities of sitting, standing, walking, 
climbing stairs, manual dexterity, range of motion, and strength measurements, including 
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lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, grip, and pinch. Mr. Davis's evaluation reported Ms. 
Murphy could sit for 100 minutes, stand for 14 minutes, dynamic stand for 19 minutes, walk 
.23 miles in 10 minutes at 1.5 mph., demonstrate a pinch strength that was "average" when 
compared to the general population, was able to reach, stoop, squat and bend, lift 30 lbs. 4 
inches, 35 lbs. 12 inches, 25 lbs. waist to chest, 20 lbs. chest to eye level, carry 25 lbs. for 30 
feet, push a 60 lb. cart for 10 feet, pull a 40 lb. cart for 10 feet, and demonstrate average 
manual dexterity according to the VALPAR Assembly test, average to poor with the 
Minnesota Rate of Manipulation test, and average to poor fine dexterity using the Purdue 
Pegboard test. Respondent's Exhibit B, pp. 2-5. 
Mr. Davis reported that Ms. Murphy demonstrated "good functional strength of the 
lower extremities with good body mechanics." He reported: 
Ms. Murphy demonstrated average functional abilities in the LIGHT physical 
Demand Characteristic of Work Level according the the U.S. Dept. of Labor. 
The limitations observed were mostly dealing with apparent poor functional 
upper extremity strength. 
Respondent's Exhibit B, p. 6. Mr. Davis's testified that based upon Ms. Murphy's ability 
to lift thirty-five pounds 12 inches to a knuckle, and her ability to lift a twenty five pound box 
and carry it thirty feet, that Ms. Murphy "would actually be into the medium category." Mr. 
Davis's testimony was consistent with his Functional Capacity Evauation, and he explained 
in more detail the procedures he used during his evaluation. Tr. 96-101. Mr. Davis testified 
that, based upon what he observed, he felt that Ms. Murphy would be capable of a light, "and 
probably capable of at least a sedentary type job." Tr. 102: 6-8. 
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The Board finds that Dr. Bateman testified she "could not provide an opinion about 
Petitioner's specific physical abilities, but could only provide a general opinion about 
individuals who suffer from fibromyalgia from her 'experience' as a 'consulting specialist' 
rather than a treating physician." Order, dated September 26, 2002, Findings of Fact, p. 2. 
Dr. Bateman testified at the hearing: 
[W]e do two types of visits: we do consultative visits and then I see patients 
who come to me for management. And she came for a consultative visit. And 
she had a number of doctors who were taking care of her, so there was no 
point in me doing management of her care. 
Tr.60: 11-16. 
The Board finds that Dr. Bateman testified "that Petitioner's worst and most difficult 
problems were pain and fatigue resulting from fibromyalgia," and that "there was no 
objective way in which to measure Petitioner's pain and fatigue, but that she relied solely on 
petitioner's self-reported symptoms." Order, dated September 26, 2002, p. 2. 
Dr. Bateman was asked at the hearing: 
[I]f you could go through her problems and her physical impairments in order 
of severity . . . As close as you can, in order of their severity . . . what are her 
most severe symptoms in 2000. 
Tr. 64: 21-23, 65: 13-15. Dr. Bateman responded: 
I can tell you that the content of our visit is, we don't list it in order of severity . . . We talk 
about fatigue, and pain, and sleep, and we do it in that order And I can tell you based on 
what I know of her and what I . . . would think that her two most, and this is true with 
fibromyalgia in general, that fatigue and pain are interconnected symptoms. And that - that 
fatigue and pain are usually the most limiting.... So I would say that pain and fatigue are 
right up there as number one and two. 
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Tr. 66: 2-13, 68: 2-3. Dr. Bateman was asked: 
And when you diagnose pain or fatigue, are those objective observations or 
are they subjective, as to what the patient describes? 
Dr. Bateman responded: 
By definition they're subjective. I believe that indirectly you can get objective 
data, but it has to do with looking at performance, looking at what they've 
been able to do, and see if their symptoms are consistent. But by very nature, 
fibromyalgia, its complete diagnosis, its clinical diagnosis and everything 
about it is subjective. With the exception of tender points, which are a feeble 
attempt to rescue some kind of objective data for these patients. That's all we 
have, except the things I quoted you. I talked to you about lots of objective 
data used on a research basis, it just has not evolved to the point where it's 
used clinically. 
Tr. 81:18-25,82: 1-7. 
The Board finds that Dr. Bateman testified she was not an employment specialist and 
did not know the legal standards for disability in this case. Order, dated September 26,2002, 
Findings of Fact, p. 2. At the hearing Dr. Bateman testified as follows: 
Q. So have you provided impairment ratings for individuals, patients in the 
past? 
A. You know, I don't use the term impairment ratings. Maybe it would be a 
better way to - you know, I assess level of function and make determinations 
about how impaired people are, and I do that on many occasions. 
Q. Are you aware how, say, the Utah Department of Lavor classifies 
fibromyalgia for impairment ratings? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Would that be important in determining whether they're disabled, 
to look at a standard to determine impairment? 
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A. You know, Id like to say that I'm not the one determining if she's disabled. 
I made a comment in my assessment about whether she was disabled. My 
consultation is to - to (inaudible), to assess her illness and her combined 
symptoms, and to make a statement about what I think her multiple problems 
are. And then I made a one-sentence recommendation about whether I thought 
she was disabled or not. But I'm not the one determining disability. 
Tr. 79: 21-25, 80: 1-16. 
The Board Did Not Support Its Decision With Substantial Evidence. Board correctly 
pointed out in its findings that Dr. Bateman is not an employment specialist, and as Dr. 
Bateman acknowledged, she is capable of determining the level of impairment, but not the 
issue of "disability." Mr. Davis, however, is also not an employment specialist, and his 
testimony and curriculum vita indicate he does not have the training or experience to opine 
on the issue of "disability." No vocational experts testified at the hearing. 
Mr. Davis testified he uses a "chart" for determining which category of "physical 
demand level" individuals are capable of. Mr. Davis testified that he placed Ms. Murphy in 
the "light" physical demand level in his evaluation. Tr. 90:13-25. He also testified that base 
on her ability to lift thirty-five pounds twelve inches, and her ability to carry a twenty-five 
pound box thirty feet, she demonstrated she "would actually be into the medium category." 
Tr. 100: 8-17. At the hearing Petitioner's attorney objected to Mr. Davis's "physical 
demand characteristics work chart" in that this chart was not the "best evidence" of the 
DOT's descriptions of its strength ratings of jobs, was an incomplete summary of the DOT, 
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and did not contain important aspects of the original document.9 Tr. 90: 23-25, 91: -92. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(b)(iii) provides that a presiding officer: 
may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy 
or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the original document. 
In this case, the "work chart" may have been admitted as evidence of what Mr. Davis based 
the vocational aspects of his evaluation upon, but would have been inadmissible as a 
representation of the DOT's "strength ratings" that Mr. Davis erroneously believed he was 
applying. Mr. Davis testified he has never seen the actual DOT. Tr. 103: 5-6. 
The DOT places the exertional requirements for work activities into categories of 
"sedentary," "light," "medium," "heavy," and "very heavy." These levels of exertion 
include, as an important element of categorization, durational requirements, i.e., the 
exertional levels required for the job-related activities of sitting, standing, walking, lifting, 
carrying, pushing/pulling are measured not only in terms of exerting "pounds of force," but 
also in terms of sustaining that exertion of force over varying periods of time. According to 
^ h e transcript does not record specific objections by Petitioner's attorney 
concerning the "work chart." A discussion of the chart occurred "off the record," during a 
recess ordered by the hearing officer. The transcript does record that the "work chart" 
was believed to be based upon the Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles ("DOT") strength ratings. A true copy of the DOT's job category strength ratings 
was offered by Petitioner's attorney-which the transcript indicates the hearing officer 
accepted into evidence and marked as Exhibit "C." Respondent's attorney objected to 
the true copy of the DOT coming into evidence as the Board's exhibit, however it is 
unclear from the transcript whether the true copy of the DOT came in as Petitioner's or 
Respondent's exhibit. It is also unclear from the transcript whether the "work chart," 
itself, was admitted into evidence. Tr. 90: 13-25; 91, 92. 
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the DOT, "frequently" means from one-third to two-thirds of the time, and "occasionally" 
means up to one-third of the time. These requirements for exerting pounds of force as a 
sustained effort over time, is a concept that is central to the DOT's exertional levels or 
"strength ratings" for job categories. Mr. Davis testified he was unaware of the element of 
time required in the DOT's description of its "strength rating" categories. 
According to the DOT, a "light" level of exertion requires an individual to walk or 
stand "frequently"- up to six hours out of an eight-hour work day 10-exert up to 20 pounds of 
force "occasionally"-up to two and one half hours of an eight hour workday-or sit most of 
the time but push and pull arm or leg controls. According to the DOT a "medium" level of 
exertion requires that an individual be capable of exerting twenty to fifty pounds of force for 
up to two and one half hours of an eight-hour workday ("occasionally") and/or from ten to 
twenty five pounds of force for up to 6 hours of an eight-hour work day ("frequently"), and 
be able to stand more than 6 hours per eight-hour workday. Exhibit C, p. 2. 
Because Mr. Davis was unaware of the durational requirements, he evaluated Ms. 
Murphy as demonstrating performance at a "light" level of exertion, even though she tested 
in the activity of standing for only fourteen minutes without a break, (and nineteen minutes 
with three to four short breaks) and tested in the area of walking for only ten minutes, and 
standing/walking combined for a total one hour over the two day evaluation, with sitting 
10
"Light" level is defined as "in excess of those for Sedentary Work" and the 
standing/walking requirement for "sedentary" is "occasional" or up to one-third of the 
time- approximately two and one half hours of an eight hour work-day. 
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breaks in between. Tr. 97: 10; 105: 18-25; 106; 107: 1-15. 
Although Mr. Davis had never seen the DOT or its durational requirements for 
sustained efforts, his routine for evaluating individuals does include a type of evaluation for 
extrapolating sustained efforts from his testing data. Mr. Davis testified he used the "MET" 
for estimating Ms. Murphy's ability for a sustained effort. This test consists of measuring 
her "heart rate" during a "step test." Ms. Murphy stepped up and down to a one and a half 
inch step for three minutes, took a short break, and stepped up and down to a six inch step 
for three minutes. Mr. Davis estimated that Ms. Murphy's "physiological response" placed 
her at a "light" work level. Tr. 98:2-8. Mr. Davis's training and experience, according to 
his curriculum vita and his testimony, is in the area of worker's compensation cases, and 
involve the rehabilitation and evaluation of injured workers. His undergraduate work at the 
WERK center at Brigham Young University as a physical therapy aid was where he "first got 
exposure to working with and evaluating injured workers." He later worked for four years 
in the Idaho Falls hospital where he "was in charge of and worked with exclusively workers' 
compensation cases. Mr. Davis testified that he "attended several continuing education 
courses related to evaluation and treatment of injured workers." Respondent's Exhibit A, Tr. 
86-87. Mr. Davis's background and training are important consideration in assessing his 
ability to evaluate Ms. Murphy's functional limitations-in that Ms. Murphy is not an injured 
worker. 
Dr. Bateman highlighted the problems with evaluating an individual with systemic 
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illness or chronic problems who cannot sustain activities over longer periods of time, with 
short term methods designed to test and evaluate a worker's acute injuries. Dr. Bateman 
testified she had reviewed Mr. Davis' s functional capacity evaluation and offered an in depth 
opinion about its shortcomings. Tr. 52-58, 80: 22-25, 81: 1-10. 
Dr. Bateman testified that fibromyalgia patients "are able to perform short-term and 
in a limited fashion with the consequence of escalation of their symptoms, either when they 
do it for a prolonged period, or when they do it for sequential periods." Tr. 53: 5-8. She 
opined that: 
[t]his kind of an evaluation . . . does not take into account fatigueability over 
time, in a day, with repetitive motion . . . by fatiguability I mean not only 
causing more fatigue, but causing more pain, and the two interact. It doesn't 
take into account developing overuse syndromes, which she has had well 
documented in plantar fasciitis, which is an overuse syndrome in the feet, and 
carpal tunnel which is an overuse syndrome in the hands. And is a known, 
associated problem with fibromyalgia and with hepatitis C. It doesn't take into 
account post-exertional delays in pain that occur the next day, or that 
accumulate over a period of time, which symptoms are the homework of 
fibromyalgia . . . So this kind of an assessment is not a good assessment for 
determining anything about fibromyalgia, other than, acute strength, short-term 
ability to sit. . . And I think the data in his report is fine, but extrapolating 
beyond the data becomes risky in terms of estimating someone's ability to 
work. 
Tr. 57, 58: 1-2. Ms. Murphy testified to the post-exertional delays in pain she 
experienced the days after her evaluation by Mr. Davis. Tr. 24, 25: 1-13. 
Dr. Bateman opined upon Mr. Davis's description of Ms. Murphy's pain being "non-
anatomic," stating: 
I found her symptoms to be - her report of pain to be very consistent. . . her 
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pain drawing to be consistent with her report, consistent with his report... the 
findings are entirely consistent with her syndrome, the places that pain occurs 
in fibromyalgia. And so in that way, they're entirely anatomic, and they relate 
to her prior underlying injuries. Her carpal tunnel syndrome is significantly 
anatomic; her myofascia pain from her prior head and neck injuries of her neck 
and shouders is exactly anatomic; and her foot and ankle pain... I don't know 
if it's just fibro or if it relates to, you can get a peripheral neuropathy from 
hepatitis C. 
Tr. 56: 6-25. 
Dr. Bateman testified regarding Dr. Anderson's medical statement in a Residual 
Functional Capacity Questionnaire, agreeing with Dr. Anderson that Ms. Murphy's 
impairments would likely cause her to be absent from work more than four days per month: 
Yes. In fact, I think given Joanna's combination of medical problems, that she 
would have difficulty working sequential full-time days, even in a week. 
Tr. 58:21-25,59:1-16; Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Dr. Bateman also gave her opinion regarding 
Ms. Murphy's ability to work. Responding to the hearing officers question: 
Now, based upon that diagnosis, you did not make any determination about 
whether she was impaired for working? 
Dr. Bateman testified: 
I did make a statement about that on the recent visit saying I felt like she was 
unable to work full-time due to her combined problems. 
Tr. 85: 11-13. 
Ms. Murphy and Dr. Bateman also testified to the issues delineated in pages 
eleven through fourteen of this brief. Consistent with Dr. Bateman's testimony concerning 
Ms. Murphy's loss of balance, Mr. Davis testified that the during the following stair climbing 
test, Ms. Murphy used a handrail, "primarily for assistance in balance, not necessarily for 
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assistance in strength." Tr. 98: 16-17. It is clear that Mr. Davis does not have the medical 
training to properly assess how Ms. Murphy's medical problems would be expected to effect 
her ability to perform work-related activities over a sustained period of time, such as that 
required for regular full-time employment in a competitive work environment. 
By failing to consider Ms. Murphy's medical records and other medical statements, 
the Board ignored the bulk of Ms. Murphy's case. Dr. Sara Jane Anderson, Ms. Murphy's 
regular treating physician since 1983, has the greatest familiarity with Ms. Murphy's medical 
condition and has followed the progression of her disease over the years. Petitioner's Exhibit 
4. Dr. Anderson indicated in her functional capacity evaluation that Ms. Murphy cannot 
sustain the demands of full-time work, even at a "sedentary" level of physical exertion, that 
her pain is often severe enough to interfere with her attention and concentration, and that her 
pain medication makes her drowsy. Dr. Anderson reports Ms. Murphy needs to shift 
positions at will from sitting, standing or walking, and that she can stand and walk less than 
two hours total in an eight-hour day. Dr. Anderson reports that Ms. Murphy's carpel tunnel 
leaves her with significant limitations in doing repetitive reaching, handling, and fingering, 
that her fatigue and generalized pain, including frequent headaches, would result in frequent 
absences from work, "more than four days per month." Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Ms. Murphy's 
most recent physical therapist, Debra Stafshoolt, reports functional limitations consistent 
with Dr. Anderson's. Petitioner's Exhibit 6. 
The Board failed to consider medical reports documenting Ms. Murphy's diagnoses 
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of fibromyalgia by Dr. Lee Smith, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, by Dr. Anderson, Petitioner's 
Exhibit 4, and by Dr. Bateman, Petitioner's Exhibits 8-9. The Board failed to consider 
medical reports of Dr. Stanchfield, Petitioner's Exhibit 15. The Board failed to consider 
medical reports diagnosing carpel tunnel, diagnosed by nerve conduction study, Petitioner's 
Exhibits 12 and 22, Hashimoto thyroiditis, Exhibit 15n, plantar fasciitis with edema of right 
leg, Petitioner's Exhibit 11, abnormal MRI, Petitioner's Exhibit 12, sleep diagnostic report, 
Exhibit 13, Celiac disease with pathology report, Petitioner's Exhibit 16-17, hypersensitivity 
reactions, Petitioner's Exhibits 18-20, and problems with eye inflammation, Petitioner's 
Exhibit 10. 
Mr. Davis has no training or background as a vocational expert and could offer no 
testimony concerning what exertional level of job category would be "reasonble" for Ms. 
Murphy, considering relevant vocational experience or the level of any proven impairments 
she has. "Total disability" requires vocational considerations be included in a determination 
of "reasonable" employment. The issues of whether there are occupations or jobs available 
for an individual with severe carpel tunnel, or an individual with an expected level of 
absenteeism from work, were not addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should first find that the Board incorrectly interpreted the law when 
refusing to consider the medical records and statements submitted into evidence. Second, 
this Court should find that the Board bears a burden in providing the vocational expertise 
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necessary to make its required findings on the "reasonableness" of any gainful occupation 
under the definition of "total disability," and which it failed to provide in this case. Lastly, 
this Court should find that the Board failed to base its determination upon substantial 
evidence, for all of the reasons above delineated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ft day of August, 2003. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
BY: L. Kathleen Ferro 
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63-46b-16. Judic ia l review — Formal adjudicative pro 
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review_o? 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by 
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demon-
strate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. mgs before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, cb. 72, § 26. and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610, 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jur isdic t ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary-
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court: of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving .any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court:; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
substituted "School and Institunonal Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective 
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands7* for "Division of Sover-
eign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d), 
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesig-
nated former Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as 
(2)(d) to (2Xj). 
This section is 3et out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16. 
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created by this title are not subject to alienation or assignment by the member, 
retiree, participant, or their beneficiaries and are not subject to attachment, 
execution, garnishment, or any other legal or equitable process. 
(2) The office may, upon the request of the retiree, deduct from the retiree's 
allowance insurance premiums or other dues payable on behalf of the retiree, 
but only to those entities that have received the deductions prior to February 
1, 2002 
(3) (a) The office shall provide for the division of an allowance, defined 
contribution account, continuing monthly death benefit, or refund of 
member contributions upon termination to former spouses and family 
members under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction with respect 
to domestic relations matters on file with the office. 
(b) The court order shall specify the manner in which the allowance, 
defined contribution account, continuing monthly death benefit, or refund 
of member contributions shall be partitioned, whether as a fixed amount 
or as a percentage of the benefit. 
(c) Allowances, continuing monthly death benefits, and refunds of 
member contributions split under a domestic relations order are subject to 
the following: 
(i) the period for which payments shall be made under the original 
domestic relations order may not be altered; 
(ii) payments to an alternate payee shall begin at the time the 
member or beneficiary begins receiving payments; and 
(iii) the alternate payee shall receive payments in the same form as 
payments received by the member or beneficiary. 
(4) In accordance with federal law, the board may deduct the required 
amount from any benefit, payment, or other right accrued or accruing to any 
member of a system, plan, or program under this title to offset any amount that 
member owes to a system, plan, or program administered by the board. 
(5) The board shall make rules to implement this section. 
History: C. 1953, 49-1-609, enacted by L. The 2001 amendment, effective March 15, 
1987, ch. 1, § 28; 1990, ch. 83, § 1; 1991, ch. 2001, added Subsections (3)(d) through (f) and 
224, § 2; 1994, ch. 90, § 6; 1995, ch. 197, § 8; redesignated former Subsection (3)(d) as (g) 
2000, ch. 283, § 4; 2001, ch. 141, § 6; renum- The 2002 amendment, effective March 26, 
bered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 35. 2002, renumbered this section, which formerly 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend- appeared as § 49-1-609, rewrote Subsections 
ment, effective March 16, 2000, in Subsection ( ^ (2) and (3), and redesignated former Sub-
(3)(a) substituted "service retirement" for "re- section (3)(g) as (5) 
tirement" and inserted "continuing monthly 
death benefit." 
49-11-613. Appeals procedure — Right of appeal to hear-
ing officer — Board reconsideration — Judicial 
review. 
(1) (a) All members, retirees, participants, alternative payees, or covered 
individuals of a system, plan, or program under this title shall acquaint 
themselves with their rights and obligations under this title. 
(b) A person who claims a benefit, legal right, or employment right 
under this title shall request a ruling by the executive director. 
(c) A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director with 
respect to any benefit claim or legal right under any system, plan, or 
program under this title shall request a review of that claim by a hearing 
officer. 
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(2) The hearing officer shall 
(a) be hired by the executive director after consultation with the board; 
(b) follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified under this 
title; 
(c) hear and determine all facts pertaining to applications for benefits 
under any system, plan, or program under this title and all matters 
pertaining to the administration of the office, and 
(d) make conclusions of law m determining the person's rights under 
any system, plan, or program under this title and matters pertaining to 
the administration of the office 
(3) The board shall review and approve or deny all decisions of the hearing 
officer in accordance with rules adopted by the board. 
(4) The moving party m any proceeding brought under this section shall 
bear the burden of proof 
(5) A party may file an application for reconsideration by the board upon any 
of the following grounds 
(a) that the board acted in excess of its powers; 
(b) that the order or award was procured by fraud; 
(c) that the evidence does not justify the determination of the hearing 
officer; or 
(d) that the party has discovered new material evidence that could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered or procured prior to the 
hearing. 
(6) The board shall affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the hearing 
officer, or remand the application to the hearing officer for further consider-
ation. 
(7) A party aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain judicial review by 
complying with the procedures and reqiurements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
(8) The board may make rules to implement this section 
History: C. 1953, 49-1-610, enacted by L. ment, effective March 15, 2001, added Subsec-
1987, ch. 1, § 29; 1987, ch. 112, § 2; 1987, ch. tion (3) and redesignated the former Subsec-
161, § 150; 1988, ch. 102, § 2; 1988, ch. 179, tions (3) and (4) as (4) and (5) 
§ 5; 1992, ch. 157, § 4; 1993, ch. 226, § 2; The 2002 amendment, effective March 26, 
2001, ch. 141, § 7; renumbered by L. 2002, 2002, renumbered and rewrote this section, 
ch. 250, § 36. which formerly appeared as § 49-1-610 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
49-11-614. Vesting on te rminat ion of system or plan. 
If any system or the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan is 
terminated, the accrued benefits of each member in the terminated system or 
plan shall immediately become vested and nonforfeitable. 
History: C. 1953, 49-1-613, enacted by L. 1-613, substituted "system or the Utah Gover-
1990, ch. 273, § 6; renumbered by L. 2002, nors' and Legislators' Retirement Plan" for "re-
ch. 250, § 37. tirement plan established under this title," 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend substituted "terminated system or plan" for 
ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered "plan" and deleted "100%" before "vested " 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 49 
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History: C. 1953, 49-20-406, enacted by L. 
2002, ch. 220, * 2, renumbered by L. 2002, 
ch. 220, § 4 
Cooidinat ion clause — Thus section was 
enacted as § 49 8 406 it was renumbeied bv 
the cooidination clause in L 2002 ch 220 
$ 4(2)(b) foi consistency with the 1 ecodiiication 
ot this title by L 2002 ch 250 
Effective Dates — Laws 2002 ch 220 § 3 
makes the act effective on July 1 2002 
CHAPTER 21 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' LONG-TERM 
DISABILITY ACT 
Part 1 
General Provis ions 
Section 
49-21 101 
49-21-102 
49-21-103 
49-21-104 
49-21-105 
Title 
Definitions 
Creation of program 
Creation of trust fund 
Purpose 
Part 2 
Membership Eligibility 
49-21 201 Piogiam membership — Ehgi 
bihty 
P a r t 3 
Contributions 
49-21-301 Contributions to fund program 
— Adjustment of piemium 
rate 
Part 4 
Disability Benefits 
Section 
49-21 401 Disability benefits — Apphca 
tion — Eligibility 
49-21-402 Reduction of benefit — Circum 
stances — Application for 
other benefits required 
49 21 403 Termination of disability ben 
efits — Calculation of retire 
ment benefit 
49 21-404 Annual adjustment to disability 
benefit 
49-21 405 Disability benefit — Exclusions 
49 21 406 Rehabilitative employment — 
Interview by disability spe-
cialist — Maintaining ehgibil 
lty — Additional treatment 
and care 
49-21-407 Health insurance reimburse 
ments for persons with a dis 
ability — Limitations 
P A R T I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
49-21-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Act " 
History: C. 1953, 49-9-101, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 1, § 165, renumbered by L. 2002, 
ch. 250, § 195 
Amendment Notes . — The 2002 amend 
ment, effective March 26, 2002 renumbered 
this section which formerly appeared as § 49 
9 101, and substituted 'Public Employees 
Long-Term Disability Act' for 'Utah Public Em-
ployees Disability Act ' 
49-21-102. Definitions. 
As used m this chapter 
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a period of continuous 
disability commences, and may not commence on or before the last day of 
actual work 
(2) "Elimination period" means the three months at the beginning of 
each continuous period of total disability for which no benefit will be paid 
and commences with the date of disability 
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(3) (a) "Eligible employee" means: 
(i) any regular full-time employee as defined under Section 
49-12-102 or 49-13-102, public safety service employee as defined 
under Section 49-14-102 or 49-15-102, or judge as defined under 
Section 49-17-102 or 49-18-102, whose employer provides cover-
age under this chapter, or the governor of the state; and 
(ii) an employee who is covered by a retirement program 
offered by the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of 
America, if the employee's employer provides coverage under this 
chapter; and 
(b) "Eligible employee" does not include any employee that is 
exempt from coverage under Section 49-21-201. 
(4) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period of time the 
monthly disability income benefit will be paid under Section 49-21-403 for 
any continuous period of total disability. 
(5) "Monthly disability benefit" means the monthly payments and 
accrual of service credit under Sectioa 49-21-401 and health insurance 
reimbursements paid under Section 49-21-408, or any combination of 
them. 
(6) "Objective medical impairment" means an impairment resulting 
from an injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is 
based on accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjec-
tive complaints. 
(7) "Physician" means a licensed physician. 
(8) "Regular monthly salary" means the amount certified by the partici-
pating employer as the monthly salary of the eligible employee, unless 
there is a discrepancy between the certified amount and the amount 
actually paid, in which case the office shall determine the regular monthly 
salary. 
(9) "Regular occupation" means either the primary duties performed by 
the eligible employee for the twelve months preceding the date of disabil-
ity, or a permanent assignment of duty to the eligible employee. 
(10) "Rehabilitative employment" means any occupation or employment 
for wage or profit, for which the eligible employee is reasonably qualified 
to perform based on education, training, or experience while unable to 
perform the employee's regular occupation. 
(11) (a) "Total disability" or "totally disabled" means the complete 
inability, due to objective medical impairment, whether physical or 
mental, to engage in the eligible employee's regular occupation during 
the elimination period and the first 24 months of disability benefits. 
(b) "Total disability" means, after the elimination period and the 
first 24 months of disability benefits, the complete inability, based 
solely on physical objective medical impairment, to engage in any 
gainful occupation which is reasonable, considering the eligible em-
ployee's education, training, and experience. 
History: C. 1953, 49-9-103, enacted by L. beginning "medically determinable" and ending 
1987, ch. 1, § 167; 1987, ch. I l l , § 2; 1994, "not less than 12 months" for "injury and lll-
ch. 270, § 1; 1995, ch. 197, § 22; 1996, ch. 79, ness" in the first sentence and inserted "medi-
§ 63; 1999, ch. 292, § 19; 2000, ch. 283, § 8; cally determinable" m the second sentence 
renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 196. The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- 2000, deleted "but is not hmited to" after "term 
ment, effective March 19, 1999, added Subsec- includes" m the second sentence of Subsection 
tion (6), making related designation changes, (2) and "which can be expected to result in 
and m Subsection (9) substituted the language death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
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(5) Firefighter service employees, as defined under Section 49-16-102, are 
not eligible for coverage under this chapter. 
(6) Public safety service employees, as defined in Sections 49-14-102 and 
49-15-102, who are covered under a long-term disability program offered by an 
employer which is substantially similar to this program are not eligible for 
coverage under this chapter. 
(7) Legislators are not eligible for coverage under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 49-9-203, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend-
1987, ch. 1, § 170; 1987, ch. I l l , § 3; 1991, ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered 
ch. 282, § 1; 1992, ch. 157, § 27; renum- and rewrote this section, which formerly ap-
bered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 200. peared as § 49-9-203 
PART 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
49-21-301. Contributions to fund program —Adjustment 
of premium rate. 
(1) During each legislative session, the board shall certify to the Legislature 
the employer paid premium rate expressed as a percentage of salary which is 
required to fund the Public Employees' Long-Term Disability Trust Fund. 
(2) Upon the board's recommendation, the Legislature shall adjust the 
premium rate to maintain adequate funding for the Public Employees' Long-
Term Disability Trust Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 49-9-301, enacted by L. this section, which formerly appeared as § 49-
1987, ch. 1, § 171; 1990, ch. 285, § 24; 1994, 9-301, inserted "Long-Term" in Subsection (1); 
ch. 90, § 23; renumbered by L. 2002, ch. and substituted "Public Employees' Long-Term 
250, § 201. Disability Trust Fund" for "disability trust 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- fund" m Subsection (2). 
ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered 
PART 4 
DISABILITY BENEFITS 
49-21-401. Disability benefits — Application — Eligibility. 
(1) An eligible employee shall apply for long-term disability benefits under 
this chapter by: 
(a) completing an application form prepared by the office; 
(b) signing a consent form allowing the office access to the eligible 
employee's medical records; and 
(c) providing any documentation or information reasonably requested 
by the office. 
(2) Upon request by the office, the participating employer of the eligible 
employee shall provide to the office documentation and information concerning 
the eligible employee. 
(3) The office shall review all relevant information and determine whether 
or not the eligible employee is totally disabled. 
(4) If the office determines that the eligible employee is totally disabled due 
to accidental bodily injury or physical illness which is not the result of the 
performance of an employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a 
monthly disability benefit equal to % of the eligible employee's regular 
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monthly salary, for each month the total disability continues beyond the 
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit period 
(5) If the office determines that the eligible employee is totally disabled due 
to psychiatric illness, the eligible employee shall receive 
(a) a maximum of two years of monthly disability benefits equal to % of 
the eligible employee's regular monthly salary for each month the total 
disability continues beyond the elimination period, 
(b) a maximum of $10,000 for psychiatric expenses, including rehabili-
tation expenses approved by the office's consultants, paid during the 
period of monthly disability benefits, and 
(c) payment of monthly disability benefits according to contractual 
provisions for a period not to exceed five years if the eligible employee is 
institutionalized due to psychiatric illness 
(6) If the office determines that the eligible employee is totally disabled due 
to a physical injury resulting from external force or violence as a result of the 
performance of an employment duty, the eligible employee shall receive a 
monthly disability benefit equal to 100% of the eligible employee's regular 
monthly salary, for each month the total disability continues beyond the 
elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit period 
(7) (a) Successive periods of disability are considered as a continuous period 
of disability if the period of disability 
(l) results from the same or related causes, 
(n) is separated by less than six months of continuous full-time 
work at the individual's usual place of employment, and 
(111) commences while the individual is an eligible employee cov-
ered by this chapter 
(b) The inability to work for a period of less than 15 consecutive days is 
not considered as a period of disability 
(c) If Subsection (7)(a) or (b) does not apply, successive periods of 
disability are considered as separate periods of disability 
(8) The office may, at any time, have any eligible employee claiming 
disability examined by a physician chosen by the office to determine if the 
eligible employee is totally disabled 
(9) A claim brought by an eligible employee for long-term disability benefits 
under the Public Employee's Long-Term Disability Program is barred if it is 
not commenced within one year from the eligible employee's date of disability, 
unless the office determines that under the surrounding facts and circum-
stances, the eligible employee's failure to comply with the time limitations was 
reasonable 
(10) Medical or psychiatric conditions which existed prior to enrollment may 
not be a basis for disability benefits until the eligible employee has had one 
year of continuous enrollment in the Public Employees Long-Term Disability 
Program 
(11) If there is a valid benefit protection contract, service credit shall accrue 
during the period of total disability, unless the disabled eligible employee is 
exempted from a system, or is otherwise ineligible for service credit 
History: C. 1953, 49-9-401, enacted by L. The 1999 amendment, effective March 19, 
1987, ch. 1, § 172; 1987, ch. I l l , § 4; 1995, 1999, made two minor stylistic changes in Sub-
ch. 197, § 23; 1998, ch. 267, § 10; 1999, ch. section (4) and added Subsection (6) 
292, § 20; renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, The 2002 amendment, effective March 26, 
§ 202. 2002, renumbered and rewrote this section, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
 w n i c h formerly appeared as § 49-9-401 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection 
(5) 
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Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v Morse, 692 adapted, and not that in which he was injured 
P2d 779 (Utah 1984) (decided before 1988 United States Smelting, Ret & Mining Co v 
amendment) Evans, 35 F 2d 459 (8th Cir 1929) cert denied, 
A worker'* causp of anion accrues when the ^81 U S 744, 50 S Ct 350, 74 L Ed 1157 
industrial accident occurs, a worker who knew (1930) 
of his accident within the eight-year limitations 
period and had his first medical operation Unknown preexist ing condition. 
within that period, but sought to amend his After an accident aggravated a preexisting 
award after that period, was time-haired from asymptomatic condition of employee, he was 
blinking such claims Middlestadt v Indus entitled to full compensation for the twenty 
Commn, 852 P2d 1012 lUtah Ct App 1993) percent whole person permanent partial im-
Test of total disability pairment caused by the accident Crosland v 
Employee who had onlv partial loss of vision B o a r d o f R e v i e w > 8 2 8 p 2* 5 28 (Utah Ct. App ), 
which was subject to correction by use of c e r t denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) 
glasses did not sustain total disability, the test r«:*«-i „ x> T> n
 A o r m n n ^ , %
 u , , l t , u , u / . Cited in Booms v Rapp Ccnstr Co , 720 P 2d of such disability being whether it prevents
 1 0 r , 0 ( T U , i n Q , , *^ ' 
, - j , ? L u u 1363 (Utah 1986; 
employee from doing work for which he is 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S, — 99 C J S Workmen's Compensation lump-sum compensation payment, 26 
§ 562 et seq A.L R 5th 127 
A.L.R. — Workers' compensation reopening 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial 
accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation 
as outlined in this section. 
lb) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensa-
tion, the employee has the burden of proof to show b} a preponderance of 
evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination 
of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational 
disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
liii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct 
cause of the employee's permanent total disability 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission 
shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impair-
ments that limit the employee s ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combi-
nation of impairments prevent the employee from performing the 
essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has 
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational 
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability 
claim; and 
liv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, 
taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Id) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other 
than those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3. Utah Occupational 
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(d) Each State agency will be responsible for com-
prehensive oversight management of its consultative 
examination program, with special emphasis on key 
providers. 
(e) A key consultative examination provider is a 
provider that meets at least one of the following 
conditions: 
(1) Any consultative examination provider with an 
estimated annual billing to the Social Security and 
Supplemental Security Income programs of at least 
$100,000; or 
(2) Any consultative examination provider with a 
practice directed primarily towards evaluation exami-
nations rather than the treatment of patients; or 
(3) Any consultative examination provider that does 
not meet the above criteria, but is one of the top five 
consultative examination providers in the State by 
dollar volume, as evidenced by prior year data. 
(f) State agencies have flexibility in managing their 
consultative examination programs, but at a minimum 
will provide: 
(1) An ongoing active recruitment program for con-
sultative examination providers; 
(2) A process for orientation, training, and review of 
new consultative examination providers, with respect 
to SSA's program requirements involving consultative 
examination report content and not with respect to 
medical techniques; 
(3) Procedures for control of scheduling consulta-
tive examinations; 
(4) Procedures to ensure that close attention is 
given to specific evaluation issues involved in each 
case; 
(5) Procedures to ensure that only required exami-
nations and tests are authorized in accordance with 
the standards set forth in this subpart; 
(6) Procedures for providing medical or supervisory 
approval for the authorization or purchase of consulta-
tive examinations and for additional tests or studies 
requested by consulting medical sources. This in-
cludes physician approval for the ordering of any 
diagnostic test or procedure where the question of 
significant risk to the claimant/beneficiary might be 
raised. See § 416.919m. 
(7) Procedures for the ongoing review of consulta-
tive examination results to ensure compliance with 
written guidelines; 
(8) Procedures to encourage active participation by 
physicians and psychologists in the consultative exami-
nation oversight program; 
(9) Procedures for handling complaints; 
(10) Procedures for evaluating claimant reactions to 
key providers; and 
(11) A program of systematic, onsite reviews of key 
providers that will include annual onsite reviews of 
such providers when claimants are present for exami-
nations. This provision does not contemplate that 
such reviews will involve participation m the actual 
examinations but, rather, offer an opportunity to talk 
with claimants at the provider's site before and after 
the examination and to review the provider's overall 
operation. 
(g) The State agencies will cooperate with us when 
we conduct monitoring activities in connection with 
their oversight management of their consultative ex-
amination programs. 
[56 FR 36967, Aug 1, 1991, 65 FR 11880, March 7, 2000] 
PROCEDURES TO MONITOR THE 
CONSULTATIVE EXAMINATION 
§ 416.919t Consultative examination over-
sight. 
(a) We will ensure that referrals for consultative 
examinations and purchases of consultative examina-
tions are made in accordance with our policies. We 
will also monitor both the referral processes and the 
product of the consultative examinations obtained. 
This monitoring may include reviews by independent 
medical specialists under direct contract with SSA. 
(b) Through our regional offices, we will undertake 
periodic comprehensive reviews of each State agency 
to evaluate each State's management of the consulta-
tive examination process. The review will involve 
visits to key providers, with State staff participating, 
including a program physician when the visit will deal 
with medical techniques or judgment, or factors that 
go to the core of medical professionalism. 
(c) We will also perform ongoing special manage-
ment studies of the quality of consultative examina-
tions purchased from key providers and other sources 
and the appropriateness of the examinations autho-
rized. 
[56 FR 36968, Aug 1, 1991] 
EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 
§ 416.920 Evaluation of disability of adults, in 
general. 
(a) Steps in evaluating disability. We consider all 
evidence in your case record when we make a deter-
mination or decision whether you are disabled. When 
you file a claim for Supplemental Security Income 
disability benefits and are age 18 or older, we use the 
following evaluation process. If you are doing sufcr 
stantial gainful activity, we will determine that you are 
not disabled. If you are not doing substantial gainful 
activity, we will first consider the effect of your physi-
cal or mental impairment; if you have more than one 
impairment, we will also consider the combined effect 
of your impairments. Your impairment(s) must be 
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severe and meet the duration requirement before we 
can find you to be disabled. We follow a set order to 
determine whether you are disabled. We review any 
current work activity, the seventy of your impair-
ment(s), your residual functional capacity, your past 
work, and your age, education, and work experience. 
If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at 
any point in the review, we do not review your claim 
further. Once you have been found eligible for Sup-
plemental Security Income benefits based on disabili-
ty, we follow a somewhat different order of evaluation 
to determine whether your- eligibility continues, as 
explained in § 416.994(b)(5). 
(b) If you are working. If you are working and the 
work you are doing is substantial gainful activity, we 
will find that you are not disabled regardless of your 
medical condition or your age, education, and work 
experience. 
(c) You must have a severe impairment. If you do 
not have any impairment or combination of impair-
ments which significantly limits your physical or men-
tal ability to do basic work activities, we will find that 
you do not have a severe impairment and are, there-
fore, not disabled. WTe will not consider your* age, 
education, and work experience. 
(d) When your impairment(s) meets or equals a 
listed impairment in Appendix 1. If you have an 
impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement 
and is listed in Appendix 1 or is equal to a listed 
impairment(s), we will find you disabled without con-
sidering your age, education, and work experience. 
(e) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from do-
ing past relevant work. If we cannot make a decision 
based on your current work activity or on medical 
facts alone, and you have a severe impairment(s), we 
then review your residual functional capacity and the 
physical and mental demands of the work you have 
done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, 
we will find that you are not disabled. 
(f) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from do-
ing other work. 
(1) If you cannot do any work you have done in the 
past because you have a severe lmpairment(s), we will 
consider your residual functional capacity and your 
age, education, and past work experience to see if you 
can do other work. If you cannot, we will find you 
disabled. 
(2) If you have only a marginal education, and long 
work experience (i.e., 35 years or more) where you 
only did arduous unskilled physical labor, and you can 
no longer do this kind of work, we use a different rule 
(see § 416.962). 
[50 FR 8728, March 5, 1985; 50 FR 19164, May 7, 1985; 56 
FR 5554, Feb. 11, 1991; 56 FR 36968, Aug. I,"l991; 65 FR 
80308, Dec. 21, 2000] 
§ 4 1 6 . 9 2 0 a Evaluation of mental impair-
ments. 
(a) General. The steps outlined m ^ 416.920 and 
416.^24 apply to the evaiuation of physical and mental 
impairments. In addition, when we evaluate the se-
venty of mental impairments for adults (persons a?e 
18 and over) and in persons under age 18 when Part A 
of the Listing of Impairments is used, we must follow 
a special technique at each level in the administrative 
review process. We describe this special technique in 
paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section. Using this 
technique helps us: 
(1) Identify the need for additional evidence to de-
termine impairment severity; 
(2) Consider and evaluate functional consequences 
of the mental disorder(s) relevant to your ability to 
work; and 
(3) Organize and present our findings in a clear 
concise, and consistent manner. 
(b) Use of the technique. 
(1) Under the special technique, we must first eval-
uate your pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory 
findings to determine whether you have a medically 
determinable mental impairment(s). See § 416.908 
for more information about what is needed to show a 
medically determinable impairment. If we determine 
that you have a medically determinable mental impair-
ments), we must specify the symptoms, signs, and 
laboratory findings that substantiate the presence of 
the lmpairment(s) and document our findings in accor-
dance with paragraph (e) of this section. 
(2) We must then rate the degree of functional 
limitation resulting from the impairment(s) in accor-
dance with paragraph (c) of this section and record 
our findings as set out in paragraph (e) of this sectiolT 
(c) Rating the degree of functional limitation. 
(1) Assessment of functional limitations is a com-
plex and highly individualized process that requires us 
to consider multiple issues and all relevant evidence to 
obtain a longitudinal picture of your overall degree^ of 
functional limitation. We will consider all relevant 
and available clinical signs and laboratory findings, 
the effects of your symptoms, and how your function-
ing may be affected by factors including, but not 
limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured set-
tings, medication, and other treatment. 
(2) We will rate the degree of your afunctional 
limitation based on the extent to which 'your impair; 
ment(s) interferes with your ability to1 function inde-
pendently, appropriately, effectively, and -on-a sus-
tained basis. Thus, we will consider -such factors as 
the quality and level of your overall Junctional per-
formance, any episodic limitations, the^anjount q f ^ 
pervision or assistance you require, a n d ^ ^ j j S K 
in which you are able to f u n c t i o n . ^ S e e \ I ^ j ^ 
through 12.00H of the Listing of Jmpairmenisc-w 
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on the number of sedentary, unskilled occupations or 
the total number of jobs to which the individual may 
be able to adjust, considering his or her age, education 
and work experience, including any transferable skills 
or education providing for direct entry into skilled 
work. 
(4) "Sedentary work" represents a significantly re-
stricted range of work, and individuals with a maxi-
mum sustained work capability limited to sedentary 
work have very serious functional limitations. There-
fore, as with any case, a finding that an individual is 
limited to less than the full range of sedentary work 
will be based on careful consideration of the evidence 
of the individual's medical lmpairment(s) and the limi-
tations and restrictions attributable to it. Such evi-
dence must support the finding that the individual's 
residual functional capacity is limited to less than the 
full range of sedentary work. 
(i) While illiteracy or the inability to commumcat 
m English may significantly limit an individual's ^oc; 
tional scope, the primary work functions m the bulk i 
unskilled work relate to working with things (rathe 
than with data or people) and m these work functior 
at the unskilled level, literacy or ability to comrnun 
cate in English has the least significance. Similar] 
the lack of relevant work experience would have litt] 
significance since the bulk oi unskilled jobs require r 
qualifying work experience. Thus, the functional CJ 
pability for a full range of sedentary work represenl 
sufficient numbers of jobs to indicate substantial voe; 
tional scope for those individuals age 18-44 even 
they are illiterate or unable to communicate in Ei 
glish. 
Table No. 1—Residual Functional Capacity: Max 
mum Sustained Work Capability Limited to Sec 
entary Work as a Result of Severe Medicall 
Determinable Impairment(s) 
Rule 
20101 
20102 
20103 
20104 
20105 
20106 
20107 
20108 
20109 
201.10 
20111 
20112 
20113 
20114 
20115 
20116 
20117 
20118 
20119 
20120 
20121 
Age 
Advanced age 
do 
da 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
Closely approaching 
advanced age 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
Younger individual 
age 45-49 
do 
do 
do 
do 
Education 
Limited or less 
do 
do 
High school graduate or 
more-does not provide for 
direct entry into skilled 
work 2 
High school graduate or 
more-provides for direct 
entry into skilled work 2 
High school graduate or 
more-does not provide for 
direct entry into skilled 
work 2 
do 
High school graduate or 
more-provides for direct 
entry into skilled work 2 
Limited or less 
do 
do 
High school graduate or 
more-does not provide for 
direct entry into skilled 
work 3 
High school graduate or 
more-pi ovides for direct 
entry into skilled work 3 
High school graduate oi 
more-does not provide for 
direct entry into skilled 
work 3 
do 
High school graduate or 
more-provides tor du ect 
entry into skilled work 3 
Illiterate or unable to commu-
nicate in English 
Limited or less-at least liter 
ate and able to communi-
cate in English 
Limited or less 
do 
High school graduate or more 
Previous work experience 
Unskilled or none 
Skilled or semiskdled-skills 
not transferable l 
Skilled or semiskdled-skills 
transferable l 
Unskilled or none 
do 
Skilled or semiskilled-slalls 
not transferable l 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
transferable * 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable l 
Unskilled oi none 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
transferable 
Unskilled or none 
do 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
transferable 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable 
Unskilled or none 
do 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
transferable 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable 
Decision 
Disabled 
Do 
Not dis-
abled 
Disabled 
Not dis-
abled. 
Disabled 
Not dis-
abled 
Do 
Disabled 
Do 
Not dis 
abled 
Disabled 
Not dis-
abled 
Disabled 
Not dis-
abled 
Do 
Disabled 
Not dis-
abled 
Do 
Do 
Do 
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Rule 
20122 
20123 
20124 
20125 
20126 
20127 
20128 
20129 
do 
Age 
Younger individual 
age 18-44 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
Education 
do 
Illiterate or unable to commu-
nicate in English 
Limited or less-at least liter-
ate and able to communi-
cate ui English 
Limited or less 
do 
High school graduate or more 
do 
do 
Previous worK experience 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
transferable 
Unskilled oi none 
do 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
transferable 
Unskilled or none 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
not transferable 
Skilled or semiskilled-skills 
transferable 
Decision 
Do 
Do 4 
Do 4 
Do 4 
Do 4 
Do 4 
Do 4 
Do 4 
i See 201 00(f) 
2 See 201 00(d) 
3 See 201.00(g) 
4 See 201 00(h) 
202.00 Maximum sustained work capability limited 
to light work as a result of severe medically determin-
able impairment(s). (a) The functional capacity to per-
form a full range of light work includes the functional 
capacity to perform sedentary as well as light work. 
Approximately 1,600 separate sedentary and light un-
skilled occupations can be identified in eight broad 
occupational categories, each occupation representing 
numerous jobs in the national economy. These jobs 
can be performed after a short demonstration or 
within 30 days, and do not require special skills or 
experience. 
(b) The functional capacity to perform a wide or full 
range of light work represents substantial work capa-
bility compatible with making a work adjustment to 
substantial numbers of unskilled jobs and, thus, gen-
erally provides sufficient occupational mobility even 
for severely impaired individuals who are not of ad-
vanced age and have sufficient educational competen-
cies for unskilled work. 
(c) However, for individuals of advanced age who 
can no longer perform vocationally relevant past work 
and who have a history of unskilled work experience, 
or who have only skills that are not readily transfer-
able to a significant range of semi-skilled or skilled 
work that is within the individual's functional capacity, 
or who have no work experience, the limitations in 
vocational adaptability represented by functional re-
striction to light work warrant a finding of disabled. 
Ordinarily, even a high school education or more 
which was completed in the remote past will have little 
positive impact on effecting a vocational adjustment 
unless relevant work experience reflects use of such 
education. 
(d) Where the same factors in paragraph (c) of this 
section regarding education and work experience are 
present, but where age, though not advanced, is a 
factor which significantly limits vocational adaptability 
(i.e., closely approaching advanced age, 50-54) and an 
individual's vocational scope is further significantly 
limited by illiteracy or inability to communicate in 
English, a finding of disabled is warranted. 
(e) The presence of acquired skills that are readily 
transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or 
skilled work within an individual's residual functional 
capacity would ordinarily warrant a finding of not 
disabled regardless of the adversity of age, or whether 
the individual's formal education is commensurate 
with his or her demonstrated skill level. The acquisi-
tion of work skills demonstrates the ability to perform 
work at the level of complexity demonstrated by the 
skill level attained regardless of the individual's formal 
educational attainments. 
(f) For a finding of transferability of skills to light 
work for individuals of advanced age who are closely 
approaching retirement age (age 60-64), there must 
be very little, if any, vocational adjustment required in 
terms of tools, work processes, work settings, or the 
industry. 
(g) While illiteracy or the inability to communicate 
in English may significantly limit an individual's voca-
tional scope, the primary work functions in the bulk of 
unskilled work relate to working with things (rather 
than with data or people) and in these work functions 
at the unskilled level, literacy or ability to communi-
cate in English has the least significance. Similarly, 
the lack of relevant work experience would have little 
significance since the bulk of unskilled jobs require no 
qualifying work experience. The capability for light 
work, which includes the ability to1 do sedentary work, 
represents the capability for substantial numbers of 
such jobs. This, in turn, represents substantial voca-
tional scope for younger individuals (age 18-49) even if 
illiterate or unable to communicate in English. 
Table No. 2—Eesidual Functional Capacity: Maxi-
mum Sustained Work Capability Limited to Light 
Work as a Result of Severe Medically Determin-
able Impairment(s) 
Rule Age Education Previous work experience Decision 
Advanced age Limited or less Unskilled or none Disabled 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
JOANNA MURPHY, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, : 
LONG TERM DISABILITY PROGRAM, : 
Respondent. : 
; ORDER 
File #: 01-30D 
A hearing was held on April 29, 2002, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on 
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. The Petitioner appeared with Counsel Kathleen Ferro. The 
Board was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the evidence in this matter and the legal 
memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. JoAnna Murphy ("Petitioner") was an employee of the State Health Department 
from August 23, 1986, through July 10, 1998 as a Family/Child Care Specialist. 
2. The Utah State Retirement Board, Long-Term Disability Program ("LTD 
Program") granted Petitioner a two year disability benefit from October 1998 through September 
2000. 
3. On July 6, 2001, Petitioner was formally denied permanent and total disability 
benefits due to a lack of objective medical documentation showing that Petitioner was totally and 
permanently disabled from all employment based solely on physical impairment. 
4. A hearing was held on April 29,2002, in which the Petitioner and Dr. Lucinda 
Bateman testified that the Petitioner's worst and most difficult problems were pain and fatigue 
resulting from fibromyalgia. Dr. Bateman testified that there was no objective way in which to 
measure Petitioner's pain and fatigue, but that she relied solely on petitioner's self-reported 
symptoms. She also testified that she was not an employment specialist and did not know the 
legal standards for disability in this case. Dr. Bateman testified she could not provide an opinion 
about Petitioner's specific physical abilities, but could only provide a general opinion about 
individuals who suffer from fibromyalgia from her "experience" as a "consulting specialist" 
rather than a treating physician. Dr. Bateman was unable to conclusively determine whether 
Petitioner suffered from any medically determinable physical impairment as a result of medically 
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. It should be noted that Dr. Bateman, in 
her entire time as a "consulting specialist," spent less time with the Petitioner than Mr. Davis in 
performing his functional capacity evaluation. No physician other than Dr. Bateman testified at 
the hearing. 
5. Mr. Cory Davis, a physical therapist that performed a Physical Functional Capacity 
Evaluation on Petitioner on November 17, 2000, and testified at the hearing on April 29, 2002, 
that according to the Petitioner's objective abilities Petitioner could physically perform "light 
duty" work. He also testified that the Petitioner, while not a malingerer, could perform more 
physical activities than she perceived of her abilities. He concluded the following in his 
testimony and in his report: 
This general attitude, combined with other observations such as 
excessive and non-anatomical pain drawing, excessively low 
functional status reporting, self limitation without observed 
secondary muscle recruitment, etc. are considered to be signs of 
symptom magnification. In describing symptom magnification, I 
am by no means implying intent. Rather, I am simply stating that 
Ms. Murphy can do more, at times, than she currently 
demonstrates, states or perceives. While her subjective reports 
should not be disregarded, they should be considered within the 
context of symptom magnification findings. 
By performing lifting and carrying activities as outlined in the chart 
above, Ms. Murphy demonstrated average functional abilities in 
LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristic of Work Level according 
to the U.S. Depart, of Labor. She demonstrated good overall body 
mechanics, utilizing functional lower extremity strength well. 
(Emphasis added.) 
6. Petitioner failed to provide any non-hearsay evidence showing she maintained any 
medically determinable physical impairment from accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic 
techniques. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-610 and § 49-9-401, Petitioner bears the 
burden of proof in this matter. The Utah State Retirement Board is not subject to any state or 
federal statute, rule, or common law, such as any shifting burden standard, in determining 
whether a Petitioner qualifies for long-term disability benefits under Utah Code Annotated, Title 
49. 
2. In order to qualify to receive permanent and total long-term disability benefits, 
3 
Petitioner must prove that she meets the definition of "totally disabled" found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 49-9-103(9), which reads in applicable part: 
Total disability means . . . the complete inability, based solely on 
medically determinable physical impairment, to engage in any gainful 
occupation which is reasonable, considering the employee's education, 
training, and experience. 
Section 49-9-101(6) defines "medically determinable impaiiment:" 
Medically determinable impairment" means an impairment that 
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical or mental 
impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting 
of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by the 
individual^ statement or symptoms. 
(Emphasis added.) 
3. In formal administrative adjudicative proceedings, "A finding of fact that was 
contested may not be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence." U.C.A. § 63-46b-10(3). 
4. Petitioner failed to meet the statutory standard of "total disability" found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-9-103(9), because she did not show any medically determinable physical 
impairment which prevented her from engaging in reasonable employment. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's appeal for permanent and total long-term 
disability benefits is denied. 
BOARD RECONSIDERATION 
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and 
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive 
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of 
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, she may seek a judicial review within 
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner 
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All 
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-17. 
DATED this %(? day of September, 2002. 
,\~^ ^"Ujy &t ^KM/l/^t 
<r
~
xJames L. Barker, Jr. / 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the Adjudicative 
Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
Dated this l£> day ofgeptombor, 2002. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
BY 
Duane C. Frisby 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this the / 1 day of-SepieHibcr, 2002,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above Order, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
L. Kathleen Ferro 
254 West 400 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David B. Hansen 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
l>tfbu fei*c^<— 
Renee-Ienssn 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' HEALTH PROGRAM 
LONG-TERM DISABILITY PROGRAM 
2002-2003 
MASTER POLICY 
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3 discontinuance of premium payments on behalf of the Eligible Employee for any 
purpose, including leave without pay and similar circumstances 
D. Pre-Existing Conditions 
Medical or psychological conditions which existed pnor to enrollment shall not be considered a 
basis for disability benefits until the Eligible Employee has had one year of continuous 
enrollment in the Program 
E. Overpayment and Recovery 
If at any time the Program has made an overpayment to the Eligible Employee, the Eligible 
Employee will have 30 days upon the receipt of written notification from the Program to make 
arrangements for repayment If arrangements are not made by the Eligible Employee to rectify 
any overpayments, the Program has the following rights 
1 cancel coverage and make a request for repayment together with all attorney fees and 
court costs, and/or 
2. offset any monies payable from the Program. 
F. Filing a Claim 
1. When an Eligible Employee is absent from employment as a result of a condition that 
may result in a Total Disability, Eligible Employee shall contact Program. 
2. Any claim brought by an Eligible Employee for long-term disability benefits is barred if 
not commenced within one year from the date of that disability, unless Eligible Employee 
can demonstrate to the Office's satisfaction, that due to extenuating circumstances the 
Eligible Employee was prevented from filing a claim within one year of the disability 
G. How to file a Claim. 
1 The following information must be submitted to and received by the Program within 90 
days of initial application 
a. Completed LTD application claim form, including a signed consent form 
allowing the office access to the Eligible Employee's medical records and 
employment records, 
b A detailed statement from Physician(s) describing the objective basis for the 
diagnosis (including x-ray reports, and any other evaluative procedures), 
2. The Program may require that the Eligible Employee be examined by a health care 
provider of the Program's choice 
3. Proof of Total Disability will be submitted at the Eligible Employee's own expense 
4. Eligible Employer must provide relevant information concerning the Eligible Employee's 
status, including; payroll information, job description, inability to perform services, job 
accommodations, etc 
5. An Eligible Employee must apply for all government disability benefits immediately 
upon application to the Program and provide proof of such filing to the Program The 
Eligible Employee must provide the Program with a copy of government's disability 
award and/or denial letters If these benefits are denied, an Eligible Employee is 
required to appeal the decision 
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6. All information requested above shall be sent to 
Public Employees Long-Term Disability Program 
560 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-2004 
Claims Appeal Process 
1 If an Eligible Employee feels a disability claim has been denied inappropriately, a full 
review of the claim may be requested by wntmg to the LTD Claims Review Committee 
within 60 days of the date of the denial letter Requests should be mailed to 
LTD Claims Review Committee 
Long-Term Disability Program 
560 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
2. If an Eligible Employee disagrees with the decision or action taken by the LTD Claims 
Review Committee, the Eligible Employee has withm 60 days the right to request an 
Administrative Review from the Executive Director. Requests should be mailed to* 
Utah Retirement Systems 
Executive Director 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
3. Upon receipt of written request, including any pertinent additional information or 
comments, the Executive Director will review the case and either grant or deny the 
request. The Eligible Employee will receive written notification withm 30 days of the 
outcome Charges for medical records necessary for claims review are the Eligible 
Employee's responsibility 
4. If the Eligible Employee is dissatisfied with the decision of the Executive Director, 
Eligible Employee may, withm 30 days of the denial, request a review of that claim by a 
hearing officer by filing a Request for Board Action. The Reguest for Board Action 
should be on a standard form provided by and returned to the Retirement office 
5. The hearing officer will provide a written decision to be reviewed by the Board If the 
Board finds against the Eligible Employee, the Eligible Employee may either petition the 
Board for reconsideration or, withm 30 days appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
BENEFITS 
A. Eligibility for Benefits 
1 An Eligible Employee is qualified for a Monthly Disability Benefit if the Eligible 
Employee has become Totally Disabled as a result of: 
a. an Accidental Bodily Injury; 
b. disease or illness causing Total Disability; or 
c. a physical injury resulting from external force or violence as a result of 
the performance of duty 
2 To be eligible for a monthly Total Disability benefit, a disabled Eligible 
Employee must be under the regular constant care of a Physician 
B. Calculation of Monthly Disability Benefits 
1 The Monthly Disability Benefit for a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee who 
has become Totally Disabled due to Accidental Bodily Injury, disease or illness 
is equal to two-thirds of the Eligible Employee's Regular Monthly Salary 
2 The Monthly Disability Benefit for a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee who 
has become Totally Disabled due to a physical injury which is the result of 
external force or violence as a result of the performance of duty for an Employer, 
the Monthly Disability Benefit will be equal to 100% of the Eligible Employees' 
Regular Monthly Salary. 
3. The Monthly Disability Benefit for a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee who 
has become Totally Disabled due to psychiatric illness, is equal to two-thirds of 
the Eligible Employee's Regular Monthly Salary. 
a. An Eligible Employee who becomes Totally Disabled primarily 
as a result of psychiatric illness may also be eligible for a 
maximum benefit of $10,000 to be paid during the disability 
period for psychiatric expenses, including rehabilitation 
expenses approved by the Program's specialist, 
b and if the Eligible Employee is institutionalized in an accredited mental 
health institution, there is a 5 year Maximum Benefit Period benefit. 
C. Duration of Benefits 
1. Monthly Disability Benefits will be paid during a period of Total Disability or 
Total and Permanent Disability m accordance with Section I (I), and shall 
terminate m accordance with Section IH (G), or when the Eligible Employee is 
no longer disabled, whichever comes first. 
2. If a Totally Disabled Eligible Employee has exhausted Eligible Employee's two-
year own occupation benefit based on a physical impairment, the Eligible 
Employee may be eligible for a psychopathy disability benefit. 
D. Rehabilitation 
1. All Eligible Employees receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit under the 
Program shall be evaluated and when appropnate and may be required to engage 
m a rehabilitation program. Benefits will be affected as follows: 
a. The Monthly Disability Benefit will be offset by 50% of the amount 
earned in approved Rehabilitative Employment; and 
b. The rehabilitation benefitwill be payable for up to 24 months or to the 
end of the Maximum Benefit Period, whichever occurs first. 
2. Each Eligible Employee receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit shall be 
interviewed by the Program 
The Program may refer the Eligible Employee to a disability specialist for a 
review of the Eligible Employee's condition and a written rehabilitation plan 
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3 If an Eligible Employee receiving a Monthly Disability Benefit fails to 
participate m an office-approved rehabilitation program withm the limitations set 
forth by a Physician or rehabilitation specialist, the Monthly Disability Benefit 
will be suspended or terminated. 
4. The Program may, as a condition of paying a Monthly Disability Benefit, require 
that the Eligible Employee receive medical care and treatment if that treatment is 
reasonable or usual according to current medical practices 
E. Adjustments and Offsets 
1. In order to be eligible for a Monthly Disability Benefit the Eligible Employee 
must apply for all Social Security, retirement, disability, workers compensation, 
or any other insurance benefits to which the Eligible Employee may be entitled. 
2. The Monthly Disability Benefit shall be reduced by any amounts received by, or 
payable to, the Eligible Employee from the following sources for the same penod 
of time during which the Eligible Employee is entitled to receive a Monthly 
Disability Benefit. Benefits under section (2) which are mcreased to reflect a 
change m Consumer Price Index, the Monthly Disability Benefit shall not be 
further reduced but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the level in 
effect at the time of Total Disability: 
a. Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received 
by the Eligible Employee, the Eligible Employee's spouse, and 
the Eligible Employee's dependent children; 
b. workers' compensation indemnity benefits; 
c. any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement 
from a third party liable to the Eligible Employee for the 
disability, 
d. unemployment compensation benefits; 
e. automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar insurance 
payments, and 
3. The Monthly Disability Benefit shall be reduced by any amount m excess of one-
third of the Eligible Employee's Regular Monthly Salary received by, or payable 
to, the Eligible Employee from the following sources for the same penod of time 
dunng which the Eligible Employee is entitled to receive a Monthly Disability 
Benefit 
a. any employer-sponsored retirement programs; and 
b. any disability benefit resulting from the disability for which 
benefits are being received from the Program. 
4. Any amounts received by or payable to the Eligible Employee under the above 
stated sources shall be considered as amounts received, whether or not they were 
actually received. 
5. The Program may treat as a benefit any amount the Eligible Employee is entitled 
to receive, but does not receive because application is not made, and reduce the 
monthly benefit accordingly 
